A CONSIDERABLE number of words have been spoken and written about the United States balanceof-payments problem, and in the last two mnonths vigorous steps have been taken to correct the deep and persistent deficit. However, both before and after the mid-August actions, explanations of the causes of our balance-of-payments difficulties have varied widely. And, as one would expect, these different explanations have led to a variety of conclusions as to the appropriate cure. Unfortunately, many of these suggested courses have involved the pursuit of partial and specific targets, rather than focusing more broadly on the multilateral dimensions of the problem. I believe we must look to these broader aspects if we are to achieve lasting inmprovement.
Among the more specific targets for action to reduce the deficit have been the following:
Military expenditures abroad: How cami the level be reduced? How big a premium should be paid for procurement in the U.S.?
Private capital outflows: How much restraint should be imposed 0mm purchases of foreign securities, omm direct investmneut, and ou U.S. bank lending abroad?
Unfair trading practices of foreign countries: What are the best ways to reduce barriers which discriminate against U.S. exports.
am indebted to several members of the Board's staff for assistance in the preparation of these remarks, especially to Mr. Samuel Pizer, Miss Kathryn A. Morisse, and Mrs. Betty L, Barker.
Among the more generalized targets have the following: been Inflation in the United States: How can excess demand be curbed to help check deterioration in our trade account?
Structural changes and foreign competition: How can we cope with modernization amid productivity improvements abroad which enhance time ability of foreign countries to comnpete in merchandise trade with the United States?
Exchange rate adjustment: Can exchange rate adjustments be envisaged that would contribute significantly to improving the U.S. competitive position?
Cutting across these categories, tile point is often made (usually in connection with an analysis of merchandise trade flows) that our increasing deficits can be traced to transactions with a few countries or regions. Usually Japan and Canada are singled out.
It is then suggested that we should concentrate our efforts on imnproving our situation with those countries in particular.
Clearly we are dealing with a mnost complex -if not the nmost complex -problem in economic analysis and policy making. Much could be said about each of the factors or types of international transactions listed.
Yet, a clear lesson to he learned from the collapse of the payments system this year is that there are many factors at \vork -each of which on the surface can be biamned for a large part of our deficits of tile last few years. In fact, if we added up the separate effects of these different factors, we svouid quickly come to a sum that greatly exceeds our deficits. Furthermore, concentration on one aspect at a time tends to lead to policy prescriptions that are clearly inadequate. More importantly, we nmay be misled into the adoption of direct controls or other protectionist devices that can only hamper trade in the long run.
Given the comnplexity of our balance-of-payments difficulties, and in light of the current efforts to bring about a fundamental correction of the deficit, we should strive to increase our understanding of as many dimnensions of the problem as we possibly can. One way of contributing to this understanding is to look in some depth at our transactions with various regions or countries and at the overall, international transactions of those regions. There are at least two reasons supporting such an approach. These relationships are intrinsically important, and there is a need to look at them more broadly than in terms of the trade accounts alone. There is also a need to recognize that adjustment of the U.S. balance of payments involves for each of these countries or regions, not just a change in the bilateral relationship with the United States, but a many-sided adjustment involving their positions vis-à-vis the rest of the world as a whole.
With this objective in mind, and without attempting a detailed analysis of trends in U.S. trade and financial relations with major foreign countries and areas, a brief review has been made of the regional pattern of our trade and service transactions and of long-term private capital flows. The results of the analysis are presented in the following sections, but a summary can be sketched here:
The persistent deficit in our overall balance of payments (which reached an annual rate of some $20 billion in the first six months of this year) was the result of a fundamental deterioration in our competitive position which showed no signs of being checked. At mid-year, the outlook was for a further worsening in 1972. Thus, a striking change in the international competitive enviromunent was called for. The measures announced by the United States on August 15 were directed at that objective.
Among the major countries and regions of the world, there is naturally a primary interest in our trade and payments relations \vith those countries enjoying sizable surpluses -particularly Canada, Japan, and Germany. In what follows, I will focus on trends in the current and long-term capital accounts so as to avoid the wide fluctuations in the flows of short-term capital.
With respect to Canada, a striking and lasting change has occurred in the United States-Canadian bilateral relationship since the early 1960's. In 1970, the overall U.S. deficit with Canada amounted to $1.7 billion, compared with a surplus of $0.8 hillion in 1964. Indeed, Canada's overall position in the world economy has improved dramatically, and a substantial share of the gain has centered in its trade with the United States. A significant part of this strengthening is a result of the United States-Canadian automobile agreement. In the quest to correct the deficit in the U.S. balance of payments, it may be appropriate to remove the restrictions on exports of U.S. automobiles to Canada contained in the 1965 agreement.
In the case of Japan, the U.S. bilateral deficit amounted to $1.6 billion last year; in 1964 the deficit was much smaller, under $100 million, These growing deficits with Japan reflected spurts in U.S. imports. While voluntary quotas have moderated the rate of expansion in our deficit with Japan, the latter's restrictions on imports have hampered potential U.S. exports to an even greater degree. Consequently, a reduction of Japanese barriers to U.S. trade must be a principal objective of the cun'ent negotiations to rebuild the payments system. The United States overall balance of payments with Western Europe registered a sum'plus of nearly $1 billion in 1970. In 1964, our accounts were in deficit by $160 million. However, in the first six months of this year, we recorded a deficit of $1.6 billion with Western Europe. Almost half of that total was with the European Economic Community (EEC). The noticeable deterioration in the U.S. balance of payments with Western Europe in the last year or so reflected the waning of favorable capital flows and the passing of the fortuitous benefits to our trade from cyclical developments here and abroad. More fundamentally, however, the greatly strengthened position of Western Europe can be traced to a basic change in its competitive stance vis-à-vis the United States, Changes in the U.S. bilateral balance of payments with other countries have been far less dramatic, There was no significant change in our position with respect to other developed countries (Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa) between 1964 and 1970. In the case of developing nations, the major change in flows vis-à-vis the United States has been an increase in the amount of long-terrmm private capital they have received -which rose from $1 billion in 1964 to 81.6 billion last year. U.S. trade with these areas has remained virtually static since the early 1960's, showing an annual U.S. surplus of about $1.5 billion.
The bilateral balance of payments of the United States with other regions can show only a part of the overall paymnents situation which they face. We mmmst look at their surplus or deficit position with the rest of the world if we are to evaluate the extent to which they could or shommld adjust their external transactions as part of their contribution to rebuild-
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I ing the international payments system. Such a review shows that the nmajor countries which have large surpluses with the United States (particularly Canada, Germany and Japan) also have overall surpluses with the rest of the world. However, taking all the leading industm-ial countries as a group, it is clear that they will have to withstand a sizable diminution in their aggregate surpluses if the United States is to make meaningfi.ml progress in correcting its own deficit.
Regional Dimensions of the

tJ~S.Balance of Payments
The published data on the U.S. balance of payments enable one to trace our transactions with major foreign countries and areas. These data are summarized in Tables I and 11 But the basic worsening was unmistakable, and projections for 1972 indicated that a further worsening was in store unless a striking change in the international competitive environment was brought about. Data in Table IV are reported on the same basis as in Table I and Table II (e.g., balance-of-payments basis -exports and imports fob.).
The trade data reported in Table III differ from data in  Tables I, II , and IV because:
1. Imports in Table Ill are derived from export data as reported by the partner exporting countries. For example, exports of the United States tn Canada are also, by dehrmition, Canadian imports from the United States. These derived Canadian imports will differ from Canadian imports as reported in Canadian trade statistics. Table III are adjusted by the United Nations to conform to UT'. standards.
Export data in
Canada: Between 1964 and 1970 , our overall trade balance deteriorated by $4.7 billion. Of this amount, $2.5 billion was in trade with Canada. About $1.2 billion of the change in the U.S. trade balance with Canada was in automobiles, trucks, and parts. However, even apart from this special factor, U.S. The flow of private long-term capital to Canada has been relatively free from restraints, but the volume has shown no tendency to rise since the middle-1960's. In fact, the outflow was relatively small in the first half of this year (roughly $230 million). In considerable part, the slowdowmi iu these flows reflects efforts by the Canadian Government to reduce the dependence of Canadian borrowers on the U.S. capital nmarket.
Looking ahead, as the pace of economic activity picks up both in Canada and in the United States, our trade balance with Canada should improve. However, the net outflow of private capital will probably expand also. The rise in the exchange rate for the Canadian dollar should help the trade balance to become less unfavorable for the United States, Over the longer run, the bilateral trade balance may also The United States also has a deficit with Japan in the non-trade sectors of the current account, mainly direct military expenditures. This deficit also has risen over the period from about $100 million in 1964 to about $300 million in 1970. Moreover, there has been a rising private long-term capital outflow to Japan, \vhieh ivould probably be substantially larger if mestiictions were not imposed by both countries, These outflows rose sharply to nearly $0.5 billion in the first half of this year, probably reflecting expectations of a Japanese revaluation. In 1970, Japan's overall surplus on current and long-term capital transactions with the United States was about $1.6 billion, compared to a surplus less than one-third as large in 1965. In the first half of 1971, these transactions resulted in a U.S. deficit of nearly $2 billion with Japan, Although tins total was inflated by anticipatory transactions of various kinds, the underlying trend was clearly and sharply adverse to the United States.
Western Europe; After averaging deficits of about $350 million annually in 1964-67, the U.S. balance with Europe on current account and long-term capital was transformed into a surplus of $2 billion in 1963, The shift was due mainly to the impact of the tightening of U.S. controls on private capital outflows. After that, however, the surpluses diminished, and in the first six months of this year, we registered a deficit of $1.6 billion in these transactions with Western Europe.
On trade account alone, the surplus with Western Europe dipped very sharply from 1964 through 1968. Subsequently it recovered markedly as the rise in U.5. imports slowed dosvn while strong demand in Europe supported a steep rise in U.S. exports to those countries. Tile cyclical situation as between the United States and major European countries was especially favorable for the U.S. trade balance in 1970, raising the surplus to $2.9 billion -not far from the peak of 1964, However, over the coming year, as the United States moves toward snore vigorous growth, at a time when output in the European countries will probably be lagging, some reduction in the trade balance is to be expected. Already in the first half of this year, the U.S. surplus in trade with Europe was only about $1.25 billion at an annual rate.
The picture of U.S. transactions with Europe is significantly different when the whole current account is taken into consideration. On this basis, the U.S. position is noticeably weaker, The balance deteriorated by nearly $2 billion between 1964 and 1970. Of this amount, $0.5 billion was in merchandise trade, and almost $1.5 billion related to current transactions other than trade with Enrope. Principal among these were larger deficits in tourism, rising military expenditures, and reduced net receipts on investment income (especially in 1969 and 1970) due to larger interest payments from the United States on accumulating debt.
More than offsetting the worsening of current transactions \vith Europe from 1964 to 1970 was the sharp improvement in the private long-term capital accounts. These long-term capital flows shifted from a net outflow to Europe of about $2.1 billion in 1964 to a net outflow of only $0.7 billion in 1966 (after voluntary restraints on capital outflows \vere installed) and to a net inflow of about $3.5 billion in 1968 (when mandatory controls on certain capital flows were initiated) -After that the net inflow of capital from Europe diminished, although it still remained at about $1 billion in 1970. This year private long-term capital has again been flowing to Europe from the United States on an enormous scale, despite the restrictions.
The principal featnre of the change in capital flows betiveen the United States and Europe during the 1964-70 period was the dramatic increase in European investments in U.S. corporate securities and other obligations. This trend began in 1965, svhen the United States started a voluntary program to reduce the outflow of U.S. funds for direct investments abroad. The appeal induced U.S. corporations to seek financing in Europe, although the amounts involved were relatively small until 1968. In that year, the inflow of private capital from Europe (apart from short-term funds) rose to $4.5 billion, from less than $1.5 billion in 1967. The improvement reflected the combined unpact of a tightening of the direct investment controls and stepped-up European purchases of U.S. stocks in a rising market. However, the inflow has slackened since then to about $3.5 billion in 1970 and to less than $1 billion in the first half of 1971.
At the mnoment, the outlook for capital inflows from Europe is clouded by many uncertainties, not least of which is the anticipation of exchange rate changes. European purchases of U.S. corporate stocks have dwindled. In any case, after the major portfolio adjustment that occurred in 1968-69 (with the help of vigorous marketing efforts by investment funds) the "normal" level of inflows could be expected to he considerably smaller. U.S. corporations have found it more difficult to sell long-term debt abroad and instead have turned to shorter-term financing for their foreign affiliates, European direct investments in the United States had been rising until recently, and they probably will do so again once the international financial environment has settled.
Flows of U.S. private long-term capital to Europe have been held down by the controls, The steep increase in plant and equipment expenditures of European affiliates of U•S, companies (from $2 billion in 1968 to a projected $4.4 billion next year) has been largely financed from foreign sources. Banks have reduced their credits to Europe under the Voluntary Foreign Credit Restraint Program, and the growth of the European bond market has relieved demands on U.S. capital markets -not only fromn European borrowers but also from Canadians and others.
To sum up this brief review, the improvement in the U.S. bilateral balance with Europe in 1970 depended mainly on a favorable shift in capital flows that at mid-year was already showing signs of diminishing and on an enlarged trade surplus that reflected in large part a favorable cyclical situation. Even though temporary factors may have contributed a good deal to the abrupt worsening in these trade and capital transactions with Europe so far this year, the underlying trend was clearly adverse.
Other countries: United States bilateral balances with other developed countries (Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa) did not shift significantly between 1964 and 1970, As for the developing countries, the principal change in flows vis-à-vis the U.S. has been an increase in the outflow of private capital to them in the last few years. The U.S. trade balance with developing nations has been nearly static since the early 1960's, showing an annual US. surplus of about $1.5 billion,
Overall Position of Major Regions
The preceding review of the bilateral position of the United States with various regions, in terms of the balance on current account and long-term flows of private capital, can show only a part of the overall payments situation facing each of these regions. It is only by looking at their overall surpluses or deficits that we can evaluate the extent to which they could or should adjust their external transactions. In effect, the U.S. disequilibrium is the sum of the global disequffibria of other countries. So, when we speak of the adjustment that is needed from the U.S. point of view,, we are really speaking about some sizable fraction of, say, the overall German surplus, rather than being concerned only with the German position vis-à-vis the United States.
The most accessible body of data on country-bycountry transactions relates to international trade. But it has not been possible to develop an accurate set of regional flows because of discrepancies in country statistics. A matrix of regional trade flows has been constructed as a starting point for discussion (Table   III) . However, it can only be used to indicate tendencies over the period and is less accurate for any given counfry than the data given in Table IV 2 1 1 9 constituted a substantial part to mrs~of the total (Table II) . Uptothispointwehave not been considering the ef- Table VI , between 1965 and 1970 , the net official reserves of the world's principal industrial countries (other than the United States) rose almost 40 per cent -from $33 billion to $45 billion, Some of this gain (about $1.3 billion) represented allocations of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). However, most of it was associated with the U.S. deficit on the official reserve transactions basis, which totaled $9.5 billion for the period. Reserves of the countries constituting the European Economic Community (EEC) increased by over $5 billion -apart from SDR allocations. Most of the expansion was concentrated in Gennany, which gained about $6 billion. On the other hand, France was a major net loser of reserves ($2.2 billion) for that period as a whole.
siderably. Although the U.S. deficit on official transactions was quite large, U.S. reserve losses xvere held down to under $2 billion. The U.S. deficits were financed largely by borrowing.
In 1971, of course, there has been an enormous increase in reserves of foreign countries -a rise of about $20 billion through August, and an additional but relatively minor gain has been registered since then. The published U.S. balance-ofpayments data cover only the first half of the year, when the official settlements deficit reached $12 billion. However, from the figures showing changes in official reIn my opinion, the size of these reserve gains is not really representative of the size of the U.S. imbalance. It will be recalled that a dominant feature of the three-month period prior to August 15 was a massive floxv of liquid funds into those currencies that were thought to be the best candidates for appreciation. This flow included foreign funds previously held in dollar-denominated assets in the United States (mainly represented by borrowings by U.S. banks through their foreign branches) as well as outflows of U.S. funds either into foreign currencies or into high-yielding Eurodollar deposits. However, our discussion of the basic balance-of-payments position of the United States has shown that the situation was not merely a transitory crisis of confidence. Instead, the fundamental weakness in our trade and other transactions also had much to do with the deteriorating environment. The cumulative impact of these difficulties was counted for by norm-il transactions. These flows may serves of leading foreign countries, it is evident that sometimes be outright flows of liquid funds from one the U.S. deficits in the last fexv months were enormous. currency to another, or they may take the form of Gains in reserves this year have been spread among shifting the timing of delivery or payment for ordmaiy many nations -most noticeably Germany, France, the commercial or financial transactions. Perhaps the best United Kingdom and Japan. But other countries also way to illustrate the size and direction, not only of had sizable increases relative to their total reserve these volatile capital flows hut also the impact of the holdings. By the end of August, net official reserves of other trends we have been discussing, is to examine these major countries had reached $66 billion, conichanges in countries' reserve positions. pared to $12 billion of reserves held by the United
States. At the end of August, both Germany and Japan had larger reserves than the United States.
Other major reserve gainers in the 1966-70 period were Canada ($1.5 billion), Japan ($2.6 billion), and Sxvitzerland ($l..7 billion). In addition, some of tile non-industrialized countries not discussed here in-too great to permit us to continue the pursuit of the same balance-of-payments policies.
Exchange Rates and Multilateral Adjustment
Once the need for a change in policy was recognized, there could be no doubt that a large adjustment in the U.S. accounts was necessary. It was also clear that the adjustment would have to be distributed over a considerable number of countries. Part of the adjustment question involves specific actions to lessen discriminations against U.S. goods in world trade and a more equitable sharing of the burden of defense outlays.
More lastingly, however, there would have to he major changes in relative shares of xvorld trade that could be brought about over time only by some adjustment in exchange rates. We could no longer see any reasonable possibility of effecting such changes through monetary and fiscal policies to control domestic inflation. There was simply too much lost ground to be regained.
From the United States' point of view, we are interested in a constellation of exchange rates that -along with other measures in the trade and burden-sharing areas -assures elimination of our deficit and provides a safety margin over time, A key to this outcome is a surplus on current account -which will have to center mainly in a surplus on trade account. I am sure there xvill be agreement on at least one fact: no one can possibly estimate with any accuracy the effects on a particular country of the multiplicity of modifications in relative exchange rates and other features of the international monetary system that are currently at issue. This very difficulty of seeing clearly what the effects of such changes ivill be in the months and years ahead is a strong argument, in my opinion, for allowing more flexibility of exchange rates than we have had during the last 25 years. Most of the key industrial countries seem to agree that some increased flexibility is a necessary feature of the new international monetary system that will emerge from the present negotiations. However, the crux of the issue turns on the extent to which those countries with sizable trade surpluses are prepared to see these balances shaved somewhat as part of the multilateral effort to make the payments mechanism function with a reasonable degree of predictability and efficiency.
In my personal opinion, as I have stated previously, the most urgent requirement at the present time is for a wider understanding among the major industrial nations with respect to the fundamental goals of the payments system, and for a better coordination of national goals in the areas of international trade, investment, and assistance to the developing countries. The efforts to negotiate new exchange rates and to promote institutional changes are obviously necessary. But I remain less than optimistic about the long-run viability of such arrangements unless there is a broad concensus on goals. The recent Annual Meeting of the International Monetary Fund did result in some movement in that direction, in that ten of its principal industrial members agreed on a list of priorities for negotiation and a plan of work over the months ahead. However, the tough issues of exchange rate adjustment and the reduction of trade barriers remain to be resolved. If we are successful in resolving these issues and also in producing fundamental improvements in the payments system. the benefits of increased international trade and investment would he considerable.
